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[T]he very reason which makes direct taxation 
disagreeable makes it preferable.  Under it every one 
knows how much he really pays.1 
I.INTRODUCTION 
Under current property tax regimes in this country, charitable 
nonprofit organizations are treated differently not only from state to 
state and city to city, but also from municipality to municipality within 
each state.  For example, in New Jersey, Princeton University was 
recently sued by citizens even after entering into an agreement with 
the local municipality to make payments in lieu of property taxes,2 and 
hospitals now question what the property tax exemption law in their 
state requires since the Governor recently pocket-vetoed legislation 
that would have made a profound impact on charitable nonprofit 
organizations.3  Additionally, Boston, Massachusetts and Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania ask charitable organizations to voluntarily enter into 
                                                                                                                                  
1 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 864 (W.J. Ashley 
ed., Longmans, Green & Co. 1936).  
2 See Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 28 N.J. Tax 574, 578 (N.J. Tax Ct. 
2015); see also Elise Young, Princeton Will Pay $18 Million to Settle Residents’ Tax 
Case, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 14, 2016, 8:16 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-15/princeton-will-pay-18-
million-to-settle-residents-tax-case.  After announcing its agreement with the local 
municipality to pay over $21 million over a seven-year period as a payment in lieu of 
taxes, Princeton University found itself embroiled in a battle to maintain its property 
tax exemption when challenged by individual tax payers in its municipality.  Young, 
supra; see Krystal Knapp, Princeton University and Town Announce New Payment 
In Lieu of Taxes Deal, PLANET PRINCETON (Apr. 24, 2014), 
https://planetprinceton.com/2014/04/24/princeton-university-and-town-announce-
new-payment-in-lieu-of-taxes-deal/.  
3 All nonprofit hospitals in New Jersey, including Morristown Memorial 
Hospital, escaped legislation that was pocket-vetoed by Governor Christie in March 
2016 that would have required all nonprofit hospitals in the state to pay fees to their 
municipalities to cover services.  See Susan K. Livio, Christie Rejects Requiring 
Nonprofit Hospitals to Pay ‘Taxes,’ NJ.COM (Jan. 19, 2016, 7:12 PM), 
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/01/nonprofit_hospital_tax.html; see also 
Evelyn Brody, The 21st Century Fight Over Who Sets the Terms of the Charity 
Property Tax Exemption, 77 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 259, 267 (2016) (“With 15 
nonprofit hospitals appealing tax bills, on March 18, 2016 Governor Christie 
announced a two-year moratorium to give a newly appointed commission time to 
find a solution, but that controversial route requires legislative enactment.”); Susan 
K. Livio, N.J. Non-profit Hospital ‘Tax’ Advances in Senate, NJ.COM (Dec. 21, 
2016, 7:10 PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/12/nj_non-
profit_hospital_tax_advances_in_senate.html[hereinafter Livio, Non-profit Hospital 
Tax]. 
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payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs)4 regarding the property that they 
own, while other cities throughout the United States exempt charitable 
nonprofit organizations from property tax and do not require them to 
enter into PILOT agreements.5   
While the policies and practices surrounding these laws are 
complex and multi-layered, it is past time for a resolution that provides 
a uniform approach to taxing the property owned by charitable 
nonprofit organizations.6  While this issue has existed for some time, 
the sector has hit a tipping point as reports of conflicting court 
decisions occur weekly, providing little solace for charitable 
organizations.7  If charitable nonprofits do not know what is expected, 
their ability to carry out their exempt missions for the benefit of our 
communities is at stake.  The time charitable nonprofits spend 
defending themselves in court, arguing with municipal leaders, or 
creating strategies to avoid property tax, is time not spent on furthering 
their charitable missions and providing for unmet needs.  Cases such 
as Fields v. Trustees of Princeton University, AHS Hospital Corp. v. 
Town of Morristown, and Baruch SLS, Inc. v. Tittabawassee 
Township, are just the most recent examples.8 
A uniform solution has been difficult, given the various types and 
sizes of organizations in this sector.  Many charitable nonprofit 
organizations have successfully morphed into large multi-corporate 
structures, such as hospitals and universities, or hybrid organizations, 
including benefit corporations, while local soup kitchens and other  
small after-school programs struggle to operate.9  To date, there are no 
laws in this country differentiating charitable organizations by size 
(revenue) with regard to the property taxes being levied.10  The legal, 
political, policy, and practical complexities of creating a uniform 
                                                                                                                                  
4 Currently, 218 municipalities in twenty-eight states collect PILOTs from the 
charities located in their towns.  See Fan Fei et al., Are PILOTs Property Taxes for 
Nonprofits?, 94 J. URB. ECON. 109, 111 (2016). 
5 See id. at 109. 
6 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
7 See, e.g., John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax 
Exemption, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 491 (2002); see also infra note 8. 
8 See Baruch SLS, Inc. v. Tittabawassee Twp., 901 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 2017); 
Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 28 N.J. Tax 574 (2015); AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town 
of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456 (2015). 
9 See Christopher Lacovara, Strange Creatures: A Hybrid Approach to 
Fiduciary Duty in Benefit Corporations, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 815, 823 
(2011); see also Robert S. Kaplan & Allen S. Grossman, The Emerging Capital 
Market for Nonprofits, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2010), https://hbr.org/2010/10/the-
emerging-capital-market-for-nonprofits.  
10 Indeed, classifying nonprofit organizations by revenue for tax purposes would 
run counter to the organizations’ exemption from income taxation.  See § 501(c)(3). 
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property tax system in this area have been considered for years.11  
Some states, cities, and municipalities have taken action to address this 
issue, but have not provided a uniform solution.12  A solution may be 
found in British law, which follows a statutory scheme for taxing 
property owned by charities.13  Additionally, the PILOT program that 
has been in place since 2012 in Boston, Massachusetts, might also be 
worth considering when creating a model.14  However, one thing is 
evident: a solution is needed.   
Charitable nonprofit organizations structured under Section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, by their very nature and the 
laws that govern them, are exempt from federal income and other 
taxes.15  Traditionally, states have granted these organizations property 
tax exemption through their constitutions and local legislation.16  But 
over the past fifteen years, in light of economic need, it has become 
increasingly common for local governments to threaten to revoke this 
exemption, thereby stimulating the rise in PILOTS and other tax 
schemes.17  
In Parts I and II, this Article will discuss the need for a resolution 
in light of the applicable federal, state, and local laws.  Part III will 
review the developing case law and seek to clarify and define the basis 
for this trend and all of its intended and unintended consequences.  It 
will set forth the large differences among groups in this sector and ask 
whether the rise of new nonprofit corporate forms, such as the multi-
corporate entities that are now our hospitals and universities, and 
hybrid organizations, have an effect on the latest push for ignoring 
                                                                                                                                  
11 See Evelyn Brody et al., The Charitable Property-Tax Exemption and 
PILOTs, TAX POL’Y & CHARITIES 1 (Aug. 2012), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/25746/412640-The-Charitable-
Property-Tax-Exemption-and-PILOTs.PDF.  
12 See, e.g., cases cited in supra note 8. 
13 See infra notes 196–209 and accompanying text. 
14  See Payment in Lieu of Tax (PILOT) Program, CITY BOS. (Aug. 25, 2017), 
https://www.boston.gov/finance/payment-lieu-tax-pilot-program. 
15 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1 (2012); see also 
Nonprofit/Exempt Organizations, TAXES CAL. GOV’T, 
http://www.taxes.ca.gov/exemptbus.shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (showing that 
charitable nonprofit organizations structured under § 501(c)(3) could also be exempt 
from state and local sales tax, occupancy tax, payroll tax, etc. depending on the 
state).  
16 See 10 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 371–385 (West 2016); Hosp. 
Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1312 (Pa. 1985), superseded 
by statute, 61 PA. CODE § 32.1 (2017), as recognized in Betsy King LPGA Classic, 
Inc. v. Twp. of Richmond, 739 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).  
17 See Fei et al., supra note 4, at 109–12; see also PILOT Programs—The 
Nonprofit Property Tax, WAGENMAKER & OBERLY BLOG (July 15, 2015), 
http://www.wagenmakerlaw.com/blog/pilot-programs-–-nonprofit-property-tax.  
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property tax exemption, and will discuss whether an approach that 
acknowledges the differences among these organizations is more 
appropriate.  Part IV will describe the British system for comparative 
purposes.  Part V will discuss the policy issues surrounding this matter 
and ask whether there is a benefit to creating some consistency that 
would invoke a Model Act of sorts, which is discussed in Parts VI and 
VII.18   
II.PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION AND THE CHARITABLE NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATION 
The first question one might ask is, while states are granted the 
power to tax property through their constitutions, what gives them the 
authority to tax organizations that have been granted tax-exempt status 
by the federal government?  The second might be, even with this 
power, is it wise to tax their property?  The following sections review 
the history in this area and provide some understanding of this 
complex issue.  More than a federal versus state issue, political leaders 
as well as scholars are being called upon to contemplate whether 
charitable organizations hold value greater than their bottom line. 
American charity law, including property tax exemption, is rooted 
in English law, where trusts created for charitable purposes were 
afforded special treatment.19  While this tradition has long been carried 
on in the United States, it is an area that is causing great difficulty for 
municipalities, states, and the charitable tax-exempt organizations 
residing within them.20  Until recently, legislatures and courts have 
been reluctant to tax these organizations unless it is clear that there is a 
lack of charitable mission, because under the Federal Tax Code these 
organizations have been granted tax exempt status and state 
constitutions and legislation have provided the same. 21   But as 
communities with large concentrations of tax-exempt properties 
pressure legislatures to impose user fees in lieu of taxes on these 
                                                                                                                                  
18 See Cornell L. Sch. Legal Info. Inst., Uniform Laws, CORNELL L. SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform (last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (explaining that 
Model Acts propose laws on topics where reform is the main goal, and therefore, 
state legislatures may make alterations or take the parts of the legislation that they 
like best, allowing the law to be tailored to the state). 
19 See NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN F. CHERRY, TAX EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 32 (Matthew Bender ed., 3d ed. 2014); 
Janne Gallagher, The Legal Structure of Property-Tax Exemption, in PROPERTY-TAX 
EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD 3–22 (Evelyn Brody ed., 
2002). 
20 See Gallagher, supra note 19, at 3–22. 
21 Id. at 4–5.  
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organizations,22 the landscape has continued to shift.  Municipalities 
argue that they are providing police and fire protection, among other 
needed services, and deserve payments in lieu of taxes.23  According 
to Joseph Cordes, a leading scholar in the area of property tax 
literature: 
Unlike the charitable-contribution deduction under the 
income tax, the property-tax exemption has been 
somewhat controversial politically.  Many local 
governments view the exemption as a costly drain on 
their local tax base, and some scholars argue that it is 
an unfair and inefficient subsidy, because it favors 
nonprofits that own real estate and may encourage 
some to invest more in real property than they would 
otherwise.24 
Some for-profit entities claim that exemption creates an unfair 
advantage. 25   Interestingly, “exemptions and immunities for 
government-owned property, homestead allowances for owner-
occupied residences, and the exemption of large amounts of 
agricultural land value through current use-assessment are not 
politically controversial, however much they may be criticized on 
economic or policy grounds.”26  But because the definitions of charity, 
public welfare, and property value vary in state statutes and case law, 
property tax exemption for charitable tax-exempt organizations 
continues to be controversial.27  Taxing bodies structure their property 
tax regimes based on these different definitions, so finding 
                                                                                                                                  
22 Id. at 18. 
23 Id. 
24 Joseph J. Cordes et al., What is the Property-Tax Exemption Worth?, in 
PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD, supra note 
19, at 81, 81.  By the 1820s in the Unites States, states began to initiate reform in 
property taxation through a “general property” tax.  Auditor/Treasurer Manual, 
MINN. DEP’T REVENUE §§ 1.01–4 (Jan. 2016), 
http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/local_gov/prop_tax_admin/at_manual/atmanual.pdf.  
This tax attempted to impose a uniform tax rate “on all forms of property . . . 
reflecting the Jacksonian belief that the actual value of property best represented tax-
paying ability.”  Id.  
25 See Estelle James, Commercialism Among Nonprofits: Objectives, 
Opportunities and Constraints, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 282 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).  
26 Joan M. Youngman, The Politics of the Property-Tax Debate, in PROPERTY-
TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD, supra note 19, at 23, 
23. 
27 See id. at 24. 
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commonalities to create a uniform approach across the states becomes 
difficult.   
Historically, there is no clear statement of the nature and goal of 
the property tax.28  “In the form of a general tax instrument, the tax 
incorporates many elements of a charge for property-related services, 
while its base of real property value suggests that this value serves as 
either an index of ability to pay or as a measure of benefits 
received.”29  These rationales are inconsistent and create difficulty, 
especially when applied to charitable tax-exempt organizations. 30  
However, assessing a fee, especially one for services, is easier to 
explain.  An “exemption from property taxation does not necessarily 
imply an equivalent exemption from special assessments or fees.”31  
Therefore, “local governments often attempt to tax nonprofit 
institutions through fees.”32 
These disputes reflect the tension between a 
fundamental consensus that charitable organizations 
should be tax-exempt, an equally basic belief that local 
governments should be reimbursed for the property 
related services they render, and a sense that property 
wealth indicates an ability to pay either taxes or some 
form of fees.  This tension is greatest at the local level, 
where tax revenue is most likely to fund property-
related services and where there may be resentment 
against state-mandated exemptions that reduce the local 
tax base.33   
Therefore, PILOTs, which are considered fees, are ultimately 
regarded as taxes.  However, they often run afoul of statutory and 
constitutional provisions governing taxes that require uniformity and 
equality.34  Not only are there inconsistencies in whether termed a tax 
or a fee, but treatment is inconsistent as well.35 
                                                                                                                                  
28 See id. 
29 Id. 
30 See id. at 24–25.  
31 Id. at 25 (citing Loyola Marymount Univ. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) and State Highway Comm’n v. City of Topeka, 
393 P.2d 1008 (Kan. 1964)).  
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See, e.g., Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 268 (Mich. 1998); V-1 Oil 
Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 942 P.2d 906, 913 (Utah 1996); Youngman, supra 
note 26, at 25. 
35 See infra Part V. 
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III.CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND THE STATES 
Charitable organizations that qualify for federal tax exemption 
under Section 501(c)(3) must be “organized and operated exclusively 
for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur 
sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or 
animals . . . .”36  These organizations are exempt from federal income 
tax once acquiring this designation.37 
Whether or not a charitable nonprofit organization qualifies for 
other exemptions from tax, such as state sales, use, and/or property 
tax, depends on the mandate of the individual states through their 
constitutions, legislation, and case law.38  This treatment varies widely 
and is now cause for concern. 
Currently, seventeen state constitutions mandate exemption for 
charitable organizations, twenty-five grant the legislature authority to 
exempt these organizations, and eight are silent.39  “Almost half of the 
state constitutions provide property tax exemption for classes of 
nonprofits—notably, churches, educational institutions, and 
‘institutions of purely public charity’ (or some similar term).”40  In 
other states, the state constitution grants to the legislature the authority 
to grant property tax exemption.41  Even in these states the courts have 
become involved and created tests in keeping with their interpretation 
of the legislation.42 
                                                                                                                                  
36 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).  
37 § 501(a). 
38 See infra Part V. 
39 Brody, supra note 3, at 260 n.8. 
40 Id. at 260. 
41 See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“General Assembly may, by law, exempt 
from taxation: (i) Actual places of regularly stated religious worship; (ii)  Actual 
places of burial, when used or held by a person or organization deriving no private or 
corporate profit therefrom and no substantial part of whose activity consists of 
selling personal property in connection therewith; (iii) That portion of public 
property which is actually and regularly used for public purposes; (iv) That portion 
of the property owned and occupied by any branch, post or camp of honorably 
discharged servicemen or servicewomen which is actually and regularly used for 
benevolent, charitable or patriotic purposes; and (v) Institutions of purely public 
charity, but in the case of any real property tax exemptions only that portion of real 
property of such institution which is actually and regularly used for the purposes of 
the institution.”). 
42 See Carle Found. v. Cunningham Twp., 45 N.E.3d 1173, 1195–96 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2016), vacated for lack of appellate jurisdiction, 2017 IL 120427, 2017 WL 
1090961 (Ill. Mar. 23, 2017); see also Hosp. Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 
487 A.2d 1306, 1313 (Pa. 1985).  
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A. How the United States Treats Government-Owned Property 
 
“Government-owned property is exempt from local taxes almost 
everywhere in the United States, but this situation is based less on 
logic than on now-outdated historical considerations.”43  “Remarkably, 
there are no comprehensive estimates of the value of these 
exemptions.”44  What is clear is that the amount of land owned by the 
government throughout the United States is greater than the property 
owned by nonprofits.45  Interestingly, there are generally very little 
complaints about government-owned property being given exemption 
from taxes.46 
Government-owned property traditionally has been 
exempt from taxation in order to avoid an empty ritual 
whereby the sovereign taxed itself.  The implicit 
assumption of a single sovereign was quite reasonable 
in Elizabethan England, where the property tax first 
took root, but not so in the U.S. today.  The myriad 
school districts and special districts that now compete 
with counties and municipalities for property tax 
revenues were virtually nonexistent in the nineteenth 
century.  Today there is no economic reason to exclude 
all government property from the tax base.47 
Providing tax exemption to nonprofit organizations’ property grew 
out of the government exemption tradition.48  “In the seventeenth 
century, private parties did not always wait for the Crown to repair 
their bridges, causeways, seawalls or highways.  They assumed this 
responsibility whenever self-interest required and the purse 
permitted.”49  Because these activities relieved the government of a 
burden, governments provided these organizations support by 
exempting their property from tax.50  Private nonprofit organizations 
were taking on government responsibilities, and therefore received the 
                                                                                                                                  
43 H. Woods Bowman, Reexamining the Property Tax Exemption, 15 LAND 
LINES 5, 5 (2003), http://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/articles/reexamining-
property-tax-exemption.  
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); see also Baruch SLS, Inc. v. Tittabawassee 
Twp., 901 N.W.2d 843, 847(Mich. 2017); see also Hosp. Utilization Project v. 
Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1313–14 (Pa. 1985). 
49 Bowman, supra note 43, at 5. 
50 See id. 
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exemption that the government would have received.51   
In early colonial times in the United States, much like in England, 
the crown or the government could not take on all of the needs of the 
people, so nonprofit groups began providing the needed services.52  By 
assuming these responsibilities, the organizations relieved the 
government of some of its burden and oftentimes qualified for tax 
relief in the form of property tax exemption.53  Eventually, part of 
relieving the government of some of its burden became providing 
charitable care and mitigating poverty.54  Since government-owned 
property has traditionally not been taxed, in keeping with the practice 
that the government (or the crown) should not tax itself, the nonprofits 
providing these services were not taxed either, since these 
organizations were acting sua sponte as independent government 
agencies.55 
Exemptions for property owned by charitable, nonprofit 
organizations remain in place today because the government still does 
not tax itself. 56   Hospitalization Utilization Project v. 
Commonwealth,57 a noted case from Pennsylvania in this area, has 
been cited in the decisions of other states, and these influences have 
pushed this issue to the forefront in New Jersey, Illinois, and 
Michigan.58 
The following discussion of case law, that set forth and expanded 
the tests used in this area, provides a framework for structuring a 
uniform system.  While each example is unique, all bear resemblances 
                                                                                                                                  
51 See id. 
52 See Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of Philanthropy, Voluntary 
Associations, and Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1600-2000, in THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 36 (Walter W. Powell & Richard 
Steinberg eds., Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 2006).  
53 See Stephanie A. Bruch, Politicking From the Pulpit: An Analysis of the IRS’s 
Current Section 501(c)(3) Enforcement Efforts and How it is Costing America, 53 
ST. LOUIS L.J. 1253, 1259 (2009). 
54 See id.; see also Bowman, supra note 43, at 5. 
55 Bowman, supra note 43, at 6. 
56 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); see also Bowman, supra note 43, at 6 
(explaining that charitable exemptions grew out of the government exemption 
because charities took on roles of the government to alleviate poverty, thus relieving 
the government of a burden). 
57 See Hosp. Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1985) 
superseded by statute, 61 PA. CODE § 32.1 (2017), as recognized in Betsy King 
LPGA Classic, Inc. v. Twp. of Richmond, 739 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1999). 
58 See, e.g., Carle Found. v. Cunningham Twp., 45 N.E.3d 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2016), vacated for lack of appellate jurisdiction, 2017 IL 120427, 2017 WL 
1090961 (Ill. Mar. 23, 2017); Baruch SLS, Inc. v. Tittabawassee Twp., 901 N.W.2d 
843 (Mich. 2017); Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 28 N.J. Tax 574 (2015). 
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that are worth considering in order to reach a uniform solution. 
B. State Legislation and Case Law Examples 
1. Pennsylvania 
 
In Hospitalization Utilization Project,59 the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court determined the method for taxing property owned by charitable 
nonprofit organizations by interpreting the legislative intent of Act 
55.60  The test, now known as the HUP test, caused great controversy 
between the courts and the legislature when local municipalities began 
to use the test to determine whether organizations qualified for 
exemption from property tax.61  Local legislatures believed that only 
they could create this test, based on whether an organization was a 
“purely public charity.”62 
In this case, the Hospital Utilization Project (HUP), was originally 
funded by the Hospital Council to form a uniform system for the 
collection and collation of statistical data on area-wide hospital 
utilization. 63   From 1963 to 1966, HUP’s funding came from 
charitable organizations.64   However, in 1967, HUP had become 
financially secure and its contributors withdrew from the project, 
causing the participating hospitals to fund HUP through direct 
payment for its services.65  Thus, from 1967 to the date of the action, 
HUP had been solely financed through a fee-for-services 
arrangement.66  Specifically, each participating hospital was charged a 
set fee for each patient abstract it submitted to HUP.67  HUP would 
then charge everyone for its services and did not provide regular and 
continual financial aid to its individual customers that were unable to 
pay for services.68  
Under Pennsylvania law, the legislature is constitutionally limited 
and can only exempt from tax those charitable organizations that are 
institutions of “purely public charity.”69  Therefore, before the court 
                                                                                                                                  
59 See Hosp. Utilization Project, 487 A.2d at 1312–14. 
60 See 10 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 371–385 (West 2016). 
61 See Daniella Corcuera, Revisiting the Nonprofit Property-Tax Exemption: An 
Examination of the Need to Clarify Eligibility, 32 J.L. & COM. 155, 158–59 (2013). 
62 See Hosp. Utilization Project, 487 A.2d at 1312. 
63 See id. at 1309. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. at 1309–10. 
69 See id. at 1312. 
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could even question if HUP qualified for property tax exemption, it 
had to determine if HUP qualified under the Pennsylvania Constitution 
as a “purely public charity.”70 
The court looked to the landmark case YMCA of Germantown v. 
City of Philadelphia for guidance¸ where it expanded on the early 
concept of a “purely public charity” by setting forth the following 
analysis: 
First, whatever it does for others is done free of charge, 
or at least so nearly free of charge as to make the 
charges nominal or negligible; second, that those to 
whom it renders help or services are those who are 
unable to provide themselves with what the institution 
provides for them, that is, they are legitimate subjects 
of charity.71 
In the instant case, HUP offered no free service, and the 
organization operated at a profit from 1979 until 1982.72  Furthermore, 
the cash reserve was not used to aid the underprivileged, sick, or 
infirm—instead, it was used to enhance business operations. 73  
Although case law supported HUP’s assertion that receiving some 
payment for services did not conclude the “purely public charity” 
analysis, HUP’s facts were distinguishable from established case 
law.74  HUP provided no financial aid, and there was nothing in the 
record that supported a finding that HUP provided its services without 
regard to the health care facility’s ability to pay.75 
After reviewing the established case law, the court determined that 
an entity would qualify as a “purely public charity” if it: (a) advanced 
a charitable purpose; (b) donated or rendered gratuitously a substantial 
portion of its services; (c) benefited a substantial and indefinite class 
of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity; (d) relieved the 
government of some of its burden; and (e) operated entirely free from 
private profit motive.76  Based on these characteristics, HUP did not 
qualify as a “purely public charity” and did not qualify for exemption 
from property tax.77 
After determining that the Plaintiff was not entitled to exemption, 
                                                                                                                                  
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1313 (citing YMCA of Germantown v. City of Philadelphia, 187 A. 
204, 209 (Pa. 1936)). 
72 See id. at 1315. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. at 1316.  
75 See id.  
76 See id. at 1317.  
77 See id. at 1319. 
0 
! &.0 00	00
	0	
 "0
the court stated: “[T]he origin of the charitable exemption under 
Section 204, 72 P.S. § 7204, is Article VIII, section 2(a)(v) of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968 which states: ‘(a) The General 
Assembly may by law exempt from taxation: . . . (v) Institutions of 
purely public charity . . . .’”78 
Through the years, courts have applied the HUP test in varying 
degrees, and some grant more deference to the legislature than 
others.79  As recently as 2015, the Pennsylvania legislature attempted 
to amend the Pennsylvania Constitution to allow for legislative control 
of the definitions contained in Act 55, specifically, what qualifies as a 
“purely public charity,”80 for property tax exemption purposes. 
2. New Jersey 
 
Though certainly distinct from HUP, a review of two recent New 
Jersey cases provides a strikingly similar struggle between legislation 
and case law interpretation when navigating this area. 
The outcome of Fields v. Trustees of Princeton University,81 a case 
decided in 2015, provides long-term ramifications for all charitable 
nonprofits in the state by setting out not only legal criteria that the 
courts intend to follow but by providing an example of a resolution 
reached in spite of the court’s decision.  In Fields, taxpayers filed a 
complaint challenging the property tax exemptions that had been 
granted by the Municipal Tax Assessor (Assessor) for twenty-one 
individual parcels owned by Princeton University. 82   After the 
Assessor continued to grant the exemptions in 2012, 2013, and 2014 
for these and other parcels owned by Princeton, four of the original 
taxpayers filed complaints in 2014 and 2015 challenging Princeton’s 
exemption in toto.83 
                                                                                                                                  
78 Id. (emphasis added).  
79 Id. at 1319.  
80 PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b); S.B. 4, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2015).  The 
proposed amendment would add a clause to Section 2(b) of Article VIII, reading: 
“Section 2. Exemptions and special provisions. (b) The General Assembly may, by 
law: (vii) Establish uniform standards and qualifications which shall be the criteria to 
determine qualification as institutions of purely public charity under clause (v) of 
subsection (a) of this section.”  Id.  
81 See Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 28 N.J. Tax 574 (2015). 
82 Id. at 578. 
83 Id. (“In the 2011 matter, the Tax Court refused to dismiss the suit on motion 
for partial summary judgment; no appeal was taken.  Princeton then moved to 
dismiss both the 2014 and 2015 complaints before this court, which motion was also 
denied.  This time, Princeton appealed for interlocutory relief to the Appellate 
Division; the higher court denied Princeton’s motion for leave to appeal on the 2014 
and 2015 matters.  On July 14, 2015, Princeton moved for a determination as to 
continued . . . 
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The court stated in its decision84  that the determination of an 
exemption was more properly one of statutory and case law 
interpretation than one requiring any special expertise possessed of an 
assessor.85  Further stating that by analogy, the court had previously 
determined that “[i]n a proceeding in the Tax Court there is a 
presumption of correctness in favor of the county board judgment 
[with regard to value determinations] . . . . Statutory interpretation, 
however, is a question of law . . . and ‘statutory construction is 
ultimately a judicial function.’”86  The court found no justification for 
why the same reasoning would not apply equally to an assessor, as it 
does to a county board of taxation. 87   Accordingly, Princeton’s 
argument that the presumption of validity extended to the exemption 
determinations made by the Assessor was unpersuasive and 
unsupported by case law and statute.88  The Court was satisfied that 
the presumption of validity afforded the Assessor’s original tax 
assessments did not extend to tax exemptions.89 
In October 2016, the case was settled to include a $2 million 
payment in 2017 and $1.6 million in the following five years to fund 
Princeton residents receiving a homestead benefit under the New 
Jersey Homestead Property Tax Credit Act. 90   Additionally, the 
Witherspoon Jackson Development Corporation, “which helps fund 
housing for economically disadvantaged residents” will receive 
$416,700 each year from 2017 to 2019, and the town of Princeton will 
                                                                                                                                  
which party has the burden of proof in these matters, and submitted a brief 
supporting a court order placing that burden on the Taxpayers.  In response, the 
Taxpayers submitted a memorandum in opposition.  The Municipality did not submit 
a brief either in support of, or in opposition to, Princeton’s motion.  At argument, 
however, the Municipality’s counsel argued in support of the motion.”). 
84 Id. at 583–84. 
85 See, e.g., Fountain House of N.J., Inc. v. Montague Twp., 13 N.J. Tax 387, 
399–400 (1993) (stating that “[t]o examine merely the formalities of organization 
without examining the actual conduct (activities) of the corporation thereafter, would 
result in the elevation of form over substance” which could not have been “the 
legislature’s intent” in enacting section 54:4–3.6). 
86 Fields, 28 N.J. Tax at 584 (alteration in original) (citing O’Rourke v. Twp. of 
Fredon, 25 N.J. Tax 443, 450 (2010) and MacDonald v. Shaker Heights Bd. of 
Income Tax Review, 41 N.E.3d 376, 380 (2015) (stating that “[t]he appellate 
decisions in tax cases do not indicate that any deference is owed to the municipal tax 
board on issues of law.”). 
87 See O’Rourke, 25 N.J. Tax at 451. 
88 See id. at 451–52. 
89 See id. 
90 Anna Merriman, Princeton U., Residents Reach Agreement in Tax Exemption 
Lawsuit, NJ.COM (Oct. 14, 2016, 7:53 PM), 
http://www.nj.com/mercer/index.ssf/2016/10/princeton_u_residents_reach_agreeme
nt_in_tax_exemp.html. 
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receive a $3.5 million annual contribution in 2021 and 2022.91  
In another example, AHS Hospital Corp. v. Town of Morristown,92 
the Hospital, as taxpayer, sought review of the town’s denial of 
property tax exemption under a statute granting exemption for 
nonprofit organizations.  Following trial, the Tax Court held that: the 
for-profit activities of physicians who worked for the hospital were not 
separately accounted for; the nonprofit activities carried out by the 
hospital were not listed separately in the financial sheets; some 
hospital property was used for the benefit of for-profit entities; and 
several contracts entered into with physicians were for profit-making 
purposes.93  Further, the court stated that the food and laundry service 
contracts were entered into for profit making purposes and the gift 
shop did not serve the hospital’s charitable purpose.94  The court did 
distinguish that the parking garage management agreement between 
the hospital and contractor did not have a profit-making purpose and 
the auditorium and fitness center were not operated for profit.95  The 
court stated: 
[T]o secure an exemption under N.J.S.A. 54:4–3.6, the 
following three criteria must be met: “(1) [the owner of 
the property] must be organized exclusively for the 
[exempt purpose]; (2) its property must be actually and 
exclusively used for the tax-exempt purpose; and (3) its 
operation and use of its property must not be conducted 
for profit.”96 
In January 2016, the New Jersey Assembly Appropriations 
Committee approved a bill that would have required New Jersey 
hospitals to pay fees to communities to provide public safety and other 
local services.97  The statute, titled “The Hospital Community Service 
Contribution Bill,” was based on the AHS Hospital Corp. decision that 
found Morristown Medical Center operated largely as a for-profit 
hospital, making it subject to property tax.98  The two sides settled on 
                                                                                                                                  
91 Id.  
92 See AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456, 463 (2015).  
93 See id. at 501–02, 513.  
94 See id. at 528–30, 533. 
95 See id. at 535. 
96 Id. at 496 (alteration in original) (quoting Hunterdon Med. Ctr. v. Twp. of 
Readington, 951 A.2d 931, 937 (N.J. 2008) (quoting Paper Mill Playhouse v. 
Millburn Twp., 472 A.2d 517, 518 (N.J. 1984)). 
97 ASSEMB. APPROPRIATIONS COMM., S. 4093, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 
2016), http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/A5000/4903_S1.PDF.   
98 See Tax Court Rules Against Hospital in Morristown Property Tax Case, 
CTR. FOR NON-PROFITS, 
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an agreement that the hospital pay more than $15.5 million over the 
next ten years. 99   According to the bill, hospitals with for-profit 
operations would have paid the municipality that hosts them $2.50 per 
day for each hospital bed and $250 per day for each satellite 
emergency care facility. 100   In March 2016, Governor Christie 
announced a two-year moratorium of the bill to give a newly 
appointed commission time to find a solution.101 
3. Illinois 
 
Several property tax cases have been decided in Illinois recently, 
and again, involve multi-corporate hospital systems.102  In Provena 
Covenant Medical Center v. Department of Revenue, the taxpayer, 
Provena Hospitals, applied to the Champaign County board of review 
to exempt all of the forty-three parcels of land in its complex from 
property taxes for 2002.103  Provena Hospitals made this request on the 
grounds that the parcels were owned by an institution of public charity 
and that the property was “actually and exclusively used for charitable 
or beneficent purposes, and not leased or otherwise used with a view 
to profit.”104  The board of review recommended that the request be 
denied and the Illinois Department of Revenue agreed. 105   To 
determine if the parcels qualified for exemption the court considered 
distinctive characteristics of a charitable institution, which included:  
(1) it has no capital, capital stock, or shareholders; (2) it 
earns no profits or dividends but rather derives its funds 
mainly from private and public charity and held them in 
trust for the purposes expressed in the charter; (3) it 
                                                                                                                                  
http://www.njnonprofits.org/PropertyTax_MorristownMedical.html (last updated 
Feb. 27, 2017). 
99 See Tim Darragh, Atlantic Health To Pay Morristown $15.5M To Settle Tax 
Case, NJ.COM (Nov. 10, 2015, 11:36 PM), 
http://www.nj.com/morris/index.ssf/2015/11/atlantic_health_to_pay_morristown_15
5m_to_settle_t.html. 
100 See Livio, Non-profit Hospital Tax, supra note 3. 
101 John Reitmeyer, Christie Proposes Two-Year Moratorium on Hospital 
Property Tax Plan, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Mar. 21, 2016), 
http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/16/03/20/governor-proposes-two-year-
moratorium-on-hospital-property-tax-plan/. 
102 See, e.g., Provena Covenant Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 925 N.E.2d 1131 
(Ill. 2010); see also Carle Found. v. Cunningham Twp., 45 N.E.3d 1173 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2016), vacated for lack of appellate jurisdiction, 2017 IL 120427, 2017 WL 
1090961 (Ill. Mar. 23, 2017). 
103 Provena, 925 N.E.2d at 1131. 
104 Id. at 1141. 
105 See id. 
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dispenses charity to all who need it and apply for it; (4) 
it does not provide gain or profit in a private sense to 
any person connected with it; and (5) it does not appear 
to place any obstacles in the way of those who need and 
would avail themselves of the charitable benefits it 
dispenses.106  
The court determined that Provena Hospitals met the first and 
fourth factors because the organization had no capital, capital stock, or 
shareholders, and that it did not provide gain or profit in the private 
sense to any person connected with it.107  However, Provena Hospitals 
failed to meet the remaining factors.108  Regarding the second factor, 
Provena Hospitals’ funds were not derived mainly from private and 
public charity and held in trust for the purposes expressed in the 
charter.109  “They [were] generated, overwhelmingly, by providing 
medical services for a fee.”110  In addition: 
Provena Hospitals likewise failed to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that it satisfied factors three or 
five, namely, that it dispensed charity to all who needed 
it and applied for it and did not appear to place any 
obstacles in the way of those who needed and would 
have availed themselves of the charitable benefits it 
dispenses.111  
Even if these factors were not an issue, Provena Hospitals would 
still have to show that the parcels were to be used exclusively for 
charitable purposes.112  “Of the 43 real estate parcels involved . . . the 
four utilized by the Crisis Nursery [likely had] the strongest claim on 
being used exclusively for charitable purposes.” 113  However, 
“[c]haritable use of these four parcels would not, under any legal 
theory, be sufficient to also confer a charitable exemption on the 
remaining thirty-nine parcels comprising the [medical center] 
complex.”114 
Therefore, the court concluded that the Department of Revenue 
was correct in denying Provena Hospitals’ request for charitable 
                                                                                                                                  
106 Id. at 1145 (citing Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen, 233 N.E.2d 537, 
539 (Ill. 1968)). 
107 See id.  
108 See id. at 1146. 
109 See id. 
110 Id. (alteration in original).  
111 Id. 
112 See id. at 1149.  
113 Id. at 1154 (alteration in original).  
114 Id. at 1154 (alteration in original). 
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exemption as to any of the forty-three parcels.115  The court went on to 
state that had the legislature wished, it could have provided that even 
though property is used exclusively for charitable purposes, the 
property shall be exempt from taxation only if, additionally, the value 
of the charitable services equals or exceeds the estimated property tax 
liability—because, again, the legislature is free to make the terms of 
an exemption more restrictive than the terms in article IX, section 6.116 
The Illinois court discussed this issue again, several years later in 
the Carle Foundation v. Cunningham Township decision,117 where the 
plaintiff foundation owned four parcels of land, which prior to 2004, 
were exempt because of charitable use.118  In the case, the foundation 
claimed “that the four parcels should be exempt from real estate taxes 
during the assessment years 2004 to 2011 on the ground of charitable 
use.”119  Specifically, the court granted summary judgment on Count II 
of the foundation’s complaint, which sought a declaratory judgment 
“that Section 15 – 86 applies to any determination of [the 
foundation’s] entitlement to exemptions for the Four Parcels for tax 
assessment years 2004 through 2011.”120  The township defendants 
appealed, asserting that the amended statute was unconstitutional.121  
Subsection (c) of the amended statute stated: 
A hospital applicant satisfies the conditions for an 
exemption under this Section with respect to the subject 
property, and shall be issued a charitable exemption for 
that property, if the value of services or activities listed 
in subsection (e) [(35 ILCS 200/15–86(e) (West 
2014))] for the hospital year equals or exceeds the 
relevant hospital entity’s estimated property tax 
liability, as determined under subsection (g) [(35 ILCS 
200/15–86(g) (West 2014))], for the year for which 
                                                                                                                                  
115 See id. at 1155. 
116 See Provena Covenant Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Revenue of State, 894 N.E.2d 
452, 460 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008), aff’d sub nom, 925 N.E.2d 1131 (Ill. 2010). 
117 Carle Found. v. Cunningham Twp., 45 N.E.3d 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016), 
vacated for lack of appellate jurisdiction, 2017 IL 120427, 2017 WL 1090961 (Ill. 
Mar. 23, 2017).  The Illinois Supreme Court decision did not address whether the 
statute in question was unconstitutional but vacated the case on procedural grounds 
only, remanding for reconsideration of the substantive issues.  Carle Found., 2017 
WL 1090961, at *10.  See also, Oswald v. Hamer, 73 N.E.3d 536, 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2016), appeal allowed 2017 WL 4342088 (Ill. Sept. 27, 2017) (holding that § 15-86 
of the IL statute passed constitutional muster). 
118 See Carle Found., 45 N.E.3d at 1176. 
119 Id. at 1177. 
120 Id. at 1178 (alteration in original). 
121 Id. at 1190. 
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exemption is sought.122 
While the court determined that it was the intent of the legislature 
to apply this statute retroactively to any pending exemption 
determinations, such as the foundation’s, the statute was found 
unconstitutional because it exceeded the terms and conditions of the 
Illinois Constitution.123  By failing to require the subject property to be 
“used exclusively for charitable purposes”, and instead requiring a 
hospital to simply “pay for its property tax exemption with . . . 
services of equivalent value,” the legislature essentially added a new 
exemption that was not authorized by the state constitution.124  The 
language of the statute permitted “a charitable exemption for hospital 
entities that, regardless of whether they use the property exclusively 
for charitable purposes, provide just enough “[s]ervices that address 
the health care needs of low-income or underserved individuals” to 
economically counterbalance the property tax exemption.”125  This 
statute did not require any charitable use of the property at all.126 
While this case, along with Oswald v. Hamer,127 where the Illinois 
District court upheld the constitutionality of the property tax sections 
of the statute based on a statutory construction reading, exemplify how 
legislatures and courts are attempting to apply the law with 
consistency, they also show a need for uniformity in addressing the 
issue.128  The court in Oswald129 acknowledged that the plaintiff in the 
case “relied on the Fourth District’s recent decision in Carle 
Foundation”130 where “the Fourth District concluded that section 15-
86 was unconstitutional on its face” ,131 but provides that for the 
reasons set out in its decision “we have reached a different conclusion 
and respectfully disagree with the court’s decision”. 132   This 
continuing dichotomy among courts within states is reflected in other 
states as well. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
122 Id. at 1184 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
123 See id. at 1191 (citing ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 6). 
124 Id. at 1195. 
125 Id. (citation omitted). 
126 See id. 
127 Oswald v. Hamer, 73 N.E.3d 536, 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016), appeal allowed 
2017 WL 4342088 (Ill. Sept. 27, 2017). 
128 See id. (discussing 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/15-86(e) (2017)). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. (citing Carle Found. v. Cunningham Twp., 45 N.E.3d 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2016), vacated for lack of appellate jurisdiction, 2017 IL 120427, 2017 WL 
1090961 (Ill. Mar. 23, 2017)).   
131 Id. at 551. 
132 Id. 
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4. Michigan 
 
In Baruch SLS, Inc. v. Tittabawassee Township,133   Baruch, a 
nonprofit corporation,  sought property tax exemption for its adult 
foster facility, Stone Crest.134  Stone Crest was open to individuals 
eighteen years of age and older and was licensed as a specialized care 
unit with programs for the aged, developmentally disabled, physically 
handicapped, and mentally ill.135  Baruch had a faith-based philosophy 
and did not admit individuals who required isolation, restraint, or 
constant professional nursing care, unless the applicant was being 
admitted to hospice.136  No financial disclosures were required for 
admission, and Baruch contended that admission decisions were not 
based on an applicant’s ability to pay.137  Baruch never admitted any 
resident who did not have some ability to pay, but no resident was 
discharged from the facility for non-payment.138 
Additionally, Baruch maintained an “Income Based Program,” 
which reduced a resident’s monthly rate based on his or her income.139  
Its written policy for this program included eligibility criteria as 
follows: a resident must have lived at Stone Crest and have made a 
minimum of twenty-four full monthly payments; a resident must apply 
for and be determined eligible for Medicaid; and a resident must 
provide information about all available income.140  Baruch sought tax-
exempt status for real and personal property taxes under sections 
211.7o and 211.9 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, but was denied.141  
Ultimately, the tax tribunal held that Baruch was not entitled to a 
charitable exemption because Baruch did not satisfy factor five of the 
test for property tax exemption set forth in Wexford Medical Group v. 
City of Cadillac, which stated that an organization could not charge 
more for services than what was needed to maintain the program.142   
                                                                                                                                  
133 Baruch SLS, Inc. v. Tittabawassee Twp., 901 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 2017). 
134 Id. at 850 
135 See id. at 846.  
136 Id.  
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 846–47. 
139 Id. at 847. 
140 Id. 
141 Id.  
142 Id.  See Wexford Med. Grp. v. City of Cadillac, 713 N.W.2d 734, 746 (Mich. 
2006) (holding that if the overall nature of an institution is charitable, it is a 
charitable institution for purposes of property tax exemption regardless of how much 
money it devotes to charitable activities in a particular year and the provider was 
entitled to property tax exemption as a charitable institution).  Factor (5) states, “A 
‘charitable institution’ can charge for its services as long as the charges are not more 
than what is needed for its successful maintenance.”  Wexford Med. Grp., 713 
continued . . . 
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In Wexford, a 501(c)(3) organization that was jointly owned by 
Trinity Health Care and Munson Health Care, both 501(c)(3) 
organizations, claimed property tax exemption.143  Wexford’s mission 
was “providing access to quality and affordable health care services to 
the communities it serves.”144  It not only had a charity care policy that 
gave free and discounted healthcare to people whose income was 
twice the poverty level, but also had open access for Medicare and 
Medicaid patients.145  Wexford claimed that 50% of its patients were 
Medicare/Medicaid.146  Moreover, Wexford’s expected fee collection 
was 83% from self-pay patients, 75% from Blue Cross, 40.4% from 
Medicaid and 60.3% from Medicare.147  In addition to charitable care, 
Wexford also participated in offering “classes, lectures, training, 
testing and screening, and sports physicals.”148 
Wexford argued it was entitled to tax exemption as follows:  
[(1)] Real or personal property owned and occupied by 
a nonprofit charitable institution while occupied by that 
nonprofit charitable institution solely for the purposes 
for which it was incorporated is exempt from the 
collection of taxes under this act[;] 
[(2)] The real estate with the buildings and other 
property located on the real estate on that acreage, 
owned and occupied by nonprofit trust and used for 
hospital or public health purposes is exempt from 
taxation under this act, but not including excess acreage 
not actively utilized for hospital or public health 
purposes and real estate and dwellings located on that 
acreage used for dwelling purposes for resident 
physicians and their families.149 
The tax tribunal did not grant exemption to Wexford under sections 
211.7o or 211.7r, because serving thirteen Medicare or Medicaid 
patients in two years was not a sufficient number of charitable care 
patients for a hospital serving 44,000 patients per year.150  The court 
stated that the test to determine who is entitled to property tax 
                                                                                                                                  
N.W.2d at 746. 
143 See id. 
144 Id. 
145 See id. at 737. 
146 Id. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. 
149 Id. at 738 (alteration in original) (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 211.7o, 
211.7r (2017)). 
150 Id. 
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exemption is:  
(1) The real estate must be owned and occupied by the 
exemption claimant; (2) the exemption claimant must 
be a . . . [nonprofit] charitable . . . institution . . .; (3) the 
claimant must have been incorporated under the laws of 
this State; [and] (4) the exemption exists only when the 
buildings and other property thereon are occupied by 
the claimant solely for the purposes for which it was 
incorporated.151 
The court also stated that tax exemptions are narrowly construed 
because they disrupt equal taxation.152  Charitable institutions must be 
organized chiefly, if not solely, for benevolence, charity, education, or 
the promotion of science.153 
Moreover, the charges collected for services should not be more 
than are needed for the organization’s successful maintenance.154  The 
determination of the exemption depends on: (1) “whether the 
organization claiming the exemption is a charitable one,” and (2) 
“whether the property on which the exemption is claimed is being 
devoted to charitable purposes.”155  Ultimately, the court found that 
Wexford was a charitable institution entitled to tax exemption.156 
C. For-Profits and the Hybrid Influence 
 
While most of the cases discussed in this Article deal with 
hospitals and health care organizations structured as charitable, 
nonprofit organizations; there are other organizations (benefit 
corporations, for example) also incorporated for a public purpose but 
structured as for-profit corporations with a social mission.157  How are 
the property tax exemption decisions being handled in this alternative 
scenario?158  While state statutes differ, some require that the benefit 
                                                                                                                                  
151 Id. at 740 (alteration in original).  
152 Id.  
153 Id. at 741. 
154 Id. 
155 See id. 
156 Id. at 750. 
157 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33–38–120(E) (2012) (explaining that formation of a 
corporation does not prohibit the corporation from including in its general powers 
“consideration for the public welfare, or for charitable, scientific, or educational 
purposes”). 
158 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33–38–140 (2012); see also SBC Health Midwest, 
Inc. v. City of Kentwood, 894 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Mich. 2017) (holding that a 
Delaware for-profit corporation in Michigan that operated a college and requested a 
tax exemption under section 211.9(1)(a) of the Michigan Compiled Laws for 
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corporation have a “general” public purpose, while others allow 
general and “specific” public purposes. 159   In South Carolina, a 
“general” purpose is defined as “a material positive impact on society 
and the environment taken as a whole, as assessed against a third-party 
standard, from the business and operations of a benefit corporation.”160  
A “specific” public purpose can include any benefit that serves, “one 
or more public welfare, religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or 
educational purposes.”161  Specific purposes can also include any 
purpose designated by the corporation’s board of directors in keeping 
with statutory law.162  While it may be easy to deny the exemption 
when the corporate purpose is stated in general terms, the “specific” 
purposes sound much like those designated as exempt in federal and 
state law, creating a much closer connection to the charitable 
nonprofit/corporation line.  While there is currently no case law 
addressing handling property tax exemption for benefit corporations, it 
will not be long until this issue arises.163 
D. Current Solutions 
 
As this Article makes clear, states deal with taxing property owned 
by charitable nonprofit organizations inconsistently.164  In addition, the 
courts are also inconsistent in their interpretation of state statutes.165  
They allow exemptions for some organizations that fall into specified 
categories, such as churches and educational organizations, and others 
only when they meet the “charity” standard set out by state statutes.166  
Once the courts have determined that these organizations need not pay 
property taxes, the states through their municipalities oftentimes seek 
PILOTS, but again with no consistency.167  Almost all PILOTs entered 
into by municipalities are different and depend on the negotiations 
                                                                                                                                  
personal property used to operate the college can be eligible for a tax exemption if it 
meets the statutory requirements). 
159 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33–38–300 (2012); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
607.606 (West 2014) (explaining that a benefit corporation must have a general 
public benefit purpose and may identify one or more specific public benefits in its 
articles of incorporation). 
160 S.C. CODE ANN. § 33–38–130(A)(5) (2012). 
161 § 33–38–130(A)(7). 
162 Id. 
163 See Lacovara, supra note 9, at 823; Dana Reiser, Benefit Corporation-A 
Sustainable Form of Organization, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 608 (2011). 
164 See supra Part III; infra Part V. 
165 See Section III.B. 
166 See Section III.B. 
167 Daniella Corcuera, Note, Revisiting the Nonprofit Property-Tax Exemption: 
An Exemption of the Need to Clarify Eligibility, 32 L.J. & COM. 155, 162 (2013). 
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between the individual charitable organization and the municipality.  
A report published by the Lincoln Institute found that since the year 
2000, over two hundred localities in over twenty-five states collected 
PILOTs on an annual basis, and are worth more than $90 million.168  
Most of the organizations that enter into these PILOTs are larger 
nonprofits like Harvard, Yale, Massachusetts General Hospital, and 
Brown University.169  The remaining ten percent represent various 
types of organizations including churches, art and cultural 
organizations, and social service agencies.170 
E. Why PILOTs? 
 
PILOTs are seen as one answer to the financial needs of states and 
local municipalities in these hard economic times, because they are 
considered a compromise of sorts.  No matter the benefits that 
charitable nonprofit organizations bring to a community, the argument 
is always that local governments provide services to charities that they 
do not pay for, and therefore, these organizations should pay for them 
somehow. 
As communities have become more strapped for funding, the 
arguments in favor of PILOTs have become stronger.171  One scholar 
contends that PILOTs, by their very nature, are taxes by a different 
name, but with no standards or system in place.172  Because it is 
difficult to find policies for existing PILOTs, the belief is that it is not 
the payment of property taxes that is really at issue.173  “Rather, 
PILOT policies are at least in part symbolic politics—occasions for 
local government officials and spokespersons of local charities to 
negotiate their mutual dependencies and relationships.”174  Currently, 
                                                                                                                                  
168 Adam Langley et al., Payments in Lieu of Taxes by Nonprofits: Which 
Nonprofits Make PILOTs and Which Localities Receive Them? 1, 13 (Lincoln Inst. 
of Land Pol’y Working Paper WP12AL1, 2012), 
http://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/working-papers/payments-lieu-taxes-
nonprofits. 
169 Id. at 2. 
170 See id. 
171 See JOAN YOUNGMAN, A GOOD TAX: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 
PROPERTY TAX IN THE UNITED STATES 177, 186 (2016). 
172 See id. at 176–77; Richard D. Pomp, The Collision Between Nonprofits and 
Cities over the Property Tax: Possible Solutions, in THE COLLISION BETWEEN 
NONPROFITS AND CITIES OVER THE PROPERTY TAX: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 383, 386 
(E. Brody ed., 2002). 
173 Kirsten Grønbjerg & Kellie McGiverin-Bohan, Local Government Interest in 
and Justifications for Collecting Payments-in-Lieu of (Property) Taxes from 
Charities, 7 NONPROFIT POL’Y F. 7, 11–12 (2016). 
174 Id. at 12; see also Fei et al., supra note 4, at 111 (“In 1998, Leland conducted 
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218 localities in twenty-eight states receive PILOTS, concentrated in 
the Northeast, with Massachusetts and Pennsylvania accounting for 
more than half of these.175 
F. PILOT Programs—Is This a Solution? 
 
PILOTs are generally negotiated for less than what a nonprofit 
might pay in property taxes, but reports conclude that they can 
contribute significantly toward the cost of the public services they 
consume.176  As stated above, most of the PILOTs are entered into in 
the northeast and with hospitals and educational institutions.177  While 
these are agreements between nonprofits and municipalities, the term 
is also used to describe payments from for-profit businesses and state 
or federal governments, which adds to the confusion.178  A review of 
some of the details of PILOT agreements along with some statistics 
from larger cities provides some information to analyze and draw 
conclusions. 
1. Boston, Massachusetts—A Long Standing Program 
 
Although several cities have established PILOT programs, 179 
Boston has one of the most notable to date, which is oftentimes seen as 
a valuable model.  In 2012, a Boston Task Force180 was organized to 
study how best to address the property tax exemption issue in the city 
                                                                                                                                  
a survey of public officials in 73 large cities, and identified PILOTs in only seven 
cities and six states of the 51 respondents.  More recently, Kenyon and Langley and 
Langley report evidence of PILOTs and draw inferences about the characteristics of 
localities that receive them.  Using media accounts, government reports, other 
sources, and a survey of 599 cities and towns with the largest nonprofit sectors (171 
respondents), report that 218 localities in 28 states received PILOTs.  They find that 
PILOTs are concentrated in the northeastern part of the United States, with 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania communities accounting for more than half of the 
PILOT recipients they identify.  Universities and hospitals provide 92 percent of the 
measured PILOT revenues, which is sensible given their considerable financial 
resources, though this may partly reflect the survey method.” (citations omitted)).  
175 See Fei et al., supra note 4, at 112 (showing that universities and hospitals 
provide ninety-two percent of PILOT revenues). 
176 See Langley et al., supra note 168, at 15. 
177 See id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 5 (providing that the following cites have PILOT programs: Boston, 
Massachusetts; New Haven, Connecticut; Providence, Rhode Island; Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; Princeton, New Jersey; and Erie, Pennsylvania). 
180 See Eric A. Lustig, A Continuing Look at Boston’s Revised Payment in Lieu 
of Taxes (PILOT) Program: Updated Version 2.0, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. ON 
REMAND 1, 11 (2015). 
0!%0 00
*0
*0)0	*0*0*
-*0 '0
and provide recommendations, many of which were set out in an 
Urban Institute report.181  The recommendations for creating PILOTs 
included the belief that PILOTs should remain voluntary, that all 
nonprofits should be asked to contribute, except those with total 
property value less than $15 million, that PILOTs should be calculated 
based on 25% of what the nonprofit’s property would yield if taxable, 
that a dollar-for-dollar credit would be offered for services in lieu of 
taxes (SILOTs) but limited to 50% of the payment, that institutions 
would receive a credit on their PILOT in the amount of real estate 
taxes paid on properties that would ordinarily qualify for a tax 
exemption based on use, and that the new program would be gradually 
phased in over a five-year period.182  Once established, the first three 
years of this PILOT program were documented in a 2015 article,183 
finding that volunteer contributions to the PILOT program by 
nonprofits increased, with the medical community contributing the 
largest percentage to date.184 
Under the four-year-old program, the city asked nonprofits with 
more than $15 million worth of tax-exempt property in Boston to write 
checks twice a year to help offset the cost of police and fire protection, 
snow removal, and other services.185  The payments were voluntary 
contributions in lieu of taxes.186  In 2012, the city established a 
structured system and began to incrementally increase the amounts 
requested of each institution with the goal that, by fiscal year 2016, 
each nonprofit would be asked to contribute 25% of the property tax 
bill they would owe if not exempt.187  However, data shows that, of the 
nineteen colleges the city asked for payment, thirteen paid less than 
what was requested during fiscal year 2015, which concluded at the 
end of June.188  Among the eight colleges with the most valuable tax-
exempt property holdings, Northeastern University and Emmanuel 
College paid 13% of what the city requested; Emerson College paid 
19%; Boston College, 23%; Harvard University, 44%; Wentworth 
                                                                                                                                  
181 See Evelyn Brody et al., The Charitable Property-Tax Exemption and 
PILOTs, URB. INST. 1, 9 (Aug. 29, 2012), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/25746/412640-The-Charitable-
Property-Tax-Exemption-and-PILOTs.PDF.  
182 Id.  
183 See id.  
184 Id. at 11.  
185Payment in Lieu of Tax (PILOT) Program, CITY BOS., 
https://www.boston.gov/departments/assessing/payment-lieu-tax-pilot-program (last 
updated Aug. 8, 2017).  
186 Brody et al., supra note 181, at 9.  
187 See id. 
188 Lustig, supra note 180, at 4–5. 
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Institute of Technology, 50%; and Suffolk University, just over 
50%.189  Meanwhile, medical institutions, the other major nonprofit 
group that the city asked to enter into PILOT agreements, for the most 
part provided the requested amounts.190  Of those sixteen medical 
institutions, eleven paid the requested amounts during fiscal year 
2015.191 
The following chart details some of the major cities that have 
established PILOT programs, most of which are situated in the 
northeast.192 
 
U.S. Cities That Receive the Most PILOT Revenue  
Table created by Kenyon and Langley193 
City State Year PILOT REVENUE Number of 
Nonprofits 
Making 
PILOTs 
Total $ % 
General 
Revenue 
Boston  MA 2015 27,925,183 0.84% 36 
New 
Haven 
CT 2015 10,936,010 1.49% 2+ 
Providence RI 2016 8,233,374 0.94% 7 
Cambridge MA 2015 8,919,135 0.64% 15 
Princeton NJ 2015 3,610,000 5.93% 6 
Erie PA 2015 2,862,897 0.44% 13 
Baltimore MD 2015 2,411,533 0.07% 15 
Lancaster PA 2015 1,614,344 2.08% 38 
Lebanon NH 2016 1,553,546 4.78% 1 
Ithaca NY 2014 1,550,619 0.86% 2 
Pittsburgh PA 2015 419,000 0.07% 41 (in 2012) 
 
                                                                                                                                  
189 See id. 
190 See id. at 11. 
191 Matt Rocheleau, Many Colleges Missing Mark on Voluntary Payments to 
City, BOS. GLOBE (July 21, 2015), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/07/21/many-boston-colleges-fall-short-
voluntary-payments-city/D8jVTjEKrPkMOZq8N4q83M/story.html 
192 Brody et al., supra note 181, at 8. 
193 The table shows updated data for the localities identified as receiving the 
most PILOT revenue in a 2012 survey, and later still received a PILOT.  Daphne A. 
Kenyon & Adam H. Langley, Nonprofit PILOTs, LINCOLN INST. 2 tbl.1 (Nov. 2016), 
http://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/nonprofit-pilots-policy-brief-
v2.pdf.  The table “shows combined PILOT revenue for the city, county, and school 
district.”  Id.  “General revenue is from the Census Bureau’s 2013 Survey of State 
and Local Government Finances, but adjusted for inflation to match year with 
PILOT revenue for each city.”  Id. 
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Another group, the Massachusetts Municipal Association, has 
gone one step further than voluntary PILOTs and has proposed a bill 
(H. 2584, S. 1451), which would allow cities and towns, upon local 
acceptance, to require certain charitable nonprofit organizations to 
make payments in lieu of taxation to host cities and towns equal to 
25% of what they would pay if the property were not exempt.194  The 
bill would require cities and towns to adopt bylaws or ordinances to 
provide for these agreements.195 
2. Legislative Attempts That Have Failed 
 
As successful as some PILOT programs have been, examples of 
failed attempts to create PILOT programs through legislation can be 
found in several states.  Two examples can be found in New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts.  In New Hampshire, Representative 
David Hess introduced a bill to expand the business enterprise tax to 
include large nonprofits, colleges, and universities.196  The tax was a 
0.75 percent levy on interest, dividends, and compensation above a 
threshold.  It would have exempted churches and other religious 
institutions and would have applied only to nonprofits with more than 
$1.5 million in gross operating expenditures annually. 197  
Representative Hess admitted to targeting hospitals, colleges and 
universities, but because the legislation cast so wide a net and included 
smaller organizations as well, the bill was opposed by the state Ways 
and Means Committee.198   
In Lowell, Massachusetts, state Representative David Nangle 
recently proposed a revised bill,199 after meeting resistance from small 
nonprofits in an earlier attempt, that was also thwarted.  The new bill 
was meant to apply to charities “whose five highest-paid employees 
collectively make more than $2.5 million annually.”200  Representative 
                                                                                                                                  
194 S. 1451, 189th Gen. Court (Mass. 2015). 
195 See MASS. MUNICIPAL ASS’N, https://www.mma.org/mmabills (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2017). 
196 See H.B. 1509, Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2014).  
197 See id.; see also Jennifer DePaul, Short on Revenue, State and Local 
Governments Turn to Nonprofits, TAX ANALYSTS (Jan. 27, 2014), 
http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/short-revenue-state-and-local-governments-turn-
nonprofits. 
198 Taxing hospitals legislation on life support, BUS. & INDUSTRY ASS’N N.H. 
(Jan. 31, 2014),  
http://web.biaofnh.com/CWT/External/WCPages/WCWebContent/WebContentPage
.aspx?ContentID=1404.  
199 See Bill H. 3526, 190th Gen. Court (Mass. 2017).  
200 Sacha Pfeiffer, State lawmaker takes another crack at taxing nonprofits, BOS. 
GLOBE (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/03/23/state-
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Nangle explained that YMCAs and Boys and Girls Clubs would not be 
effected by this legislation,201 but several nonprofit CEOs across the 
state opposed the bill.202  
IV.THE BRITISH EXAMPLE—A SOLUTION? 
The United Kingdom uses a rating system to tax charities.203  It is 
believed that this system began as a means to assist or relieve the 
poor,204 as a poor tax became compulsory in the United Kingdom in 
1597.205  The system now defines how charities should be taxed, 
giving the local municipalities guidance in taxing charitable 
organizations owning property.206  And while this system had its own 
confusing history, with its beginnings to assist the poor, it seems 
relevant to look to this system given that our charitable exemption 
history in the United States had its beginning in the United Kingdom. 
Dating back to 1865, in the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. 
Cameron cases, 207  Lord Westbury was quoted as stating that: 
“Trustees who are in law the tenants or occupiers of valuable property 
upon trust for charitable purposes, such as hospitals . . . are in 
principle, ratable, notwithstanding that the buildings are actually 
occupied by paupers who are sick or insane.”208 
Yet, this notion was not universally accepted and only a limited 
number followed this idea, and exemptions continued on an erratic 
basis for years.209   There was no uniformity in the treatment of 
charities, but in general, charitable properties were undervalued; their 
                                                                                                                                  
rep-takes-another-crack-taxing-
nonprofits/IEDWXk0GMYeMU4j3CQRFQP/story.html. 
201 Id. 
202 Id.; see also Kevin Miller, LePage’s plans to end revenue sharing, tax 
nonprofits run into opposition in Legislature, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, 
http://www.pressherald.com/2015/04/03/lawmakers-skeptical-of-lepage-plans-to-
eliminate-revenue-sharing-tax-nonprofits/ (last updated Apr. 4, 2015) (explaining 
that the Legislature’s Taxation Committee in Maine voted against the plan to tax 
nonprofits with property values greater than $500,000). 
203 Report of the Committee on the Rating of Charities and Kindred Bodies, 
1959, Cmnd. 831, at 2 (UK) [hereinafter The Pritchard Committee Report]. 
204 Id. 
205 Id.; see JAMES KESSLER & OLIVER MARRE, TAXATION OF CHARITIES AND 
NONPROFIT ORGANISATIONS 1202 (10th ed. 2015) (noting that “ragged schools” for 
educating the very poor were exempt in 1869 under the Exemption from Rating 
Act). 
206 The Pritchard Committee Report, supra note 203, at 14–19. 
207 See Mersey Docks & Harbour Bd. Trs. v. Cameron (1865) 11 Eng. Rep. 1405 
(HL). 
208 Id. at 1427. 
209 Chantal Stebbings, An Effective Model of Institutional Taxation: Lunatic 
Asylums in Nineteenth-Century England, 32 J. LEGAL HIST. 31, 45 (2011). 
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ratable values were generally between twenty-five percent and 
seventy-five percent of their true net annual values.210  
A report of a committee that studied the rating of charities, the 
Pritchard Committee Report,211 states that the rating system in the 
United Kingdom provided “a practical basis for local taxation.”212  It 
evolved over three hundred and fifty years, from something like an 
income tax “levied to relieve the poor into a tax on the occupation of 
land levied to pay for a wide range of social and environmental 
services other than the relief of the poor.”213  The Pritchard Committee 
Report attempted to create a replacement of the old system, 
understanding that it was “impracticable to eliminate all the elements 
of arbitrariness . . . .”214  It furthermore attempted to find “a reasonable 
balance of conflicting arguments and interests, consistent with 
simplicity, certainty and economy in administration.”215  
The Pritchard Committee Report concluded with its recommended 
system, which has survived to the present day as follows: 
(12) The time has come to introduce a measure of 
uniformity and certainty into the rating reliefs enjoyed 
by bodies within our terms of reference.  A satisfactory 
scheme should be simple and economical to administer 
and should not add materially to the rates borne by 
other classes of ratepayer.  The essential basis should 
be mandatory relief for the great majority of the classes 
of organisation which have in the past enjoyed some 
measure of relief . . . 
(19) There is some justification for the proposal to give 
a greater measure of relief to “local” bodies than to 
others, but it is impracticable to draw a clear line 
between these two classes and, in the interests of 
simplicity and ease of administration, there should be a 
single rate of mandatory relief for all charities . . . 
(21) Local authorities should have power to give further 
relief to charities at their discretion  
(22) Organisations on the fringe of the field of charity 
should be eligible for relief at the discretion of the local 
                                                                                                                                  
210 See KESSLER & MARRE, supra note 205, at 1203. 
211 Id. at 1204. 
212 The Pritchard Committee Report, supra note 203, at 20. 
213 Id.  
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
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authorities.  The simplest practical solution is to leave 
the amount of the relief for these organisations entirely 
in the hands of the local authorities . . . 
(24) Rating authorities should be given power to grant 
relief to a particular body within the field for 
discretionary relief in any of the following three ways: 
(i) For the ensuing rate period only. 
(ii) For a specified term of years, not exceeding 
five, with power to decide at any time, being not 
more than two years before the expiry of one 
term, upon the amount of relief for the 
succeeding term and the length of that term. 
(iii) For an indefinite period, subject to notice of 
not less than one clear financial year to 
discontinue or reduce the relief . . . .216 
As discussed in Part VI, the clarity of this tax scheme can be replicated 
to some degree as a Model Code in the United States.217 
V.POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
As Professor Joan Youngman states in the Preface to her book, A 
Good Tax, “The property tax is a mainstay of independent local 
government revenue in this country.  It is the largest single local tax 
and supplies nearly half of all general revenue from local sources.  It 
accounts for most school district independent revenue and almost all 
school district tax revenue.”218   While this tax can be traced to 
medieval times, it has changed at any given time based on current 
economic need and local politics.219  Many see it as “an important 
instrument of land policy.”220  
The property tax is “visible and transparent”221 as it provides 
support for local governments.222  And since property is immovable 
and identifiable, it is a source easily identified for the imposition of 
taxes.  “The tax on land is also one of the few available means of 
raising public revenue that does not impede economic efficiency, 
because the fixed supply of land cannot be altered in response to the 
                                                                                                                                  
216 Id. at 43–45 (alteration in original). 
217 See infra Part VI. 
218 YOUNGMAN, supra note 171, at ix.  
219 See id. at 1. 
220 Id. 
221 Id.  
222 Id. at 2. 
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tax.”223  Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits “any 
‘direct’ federal tax unless . . . imposed in proportion to population.”224 
While property tax was an important source of revenue during the 
nineteenth century, it has become more of an important source for 
local government as states became dependent on sales and income tax 
in the twentieth century.225  “The use of the property tax as a local 
revenue source reflects its particular suitability for that function.  
Some local government services have a special relationship to real 
property, such as fire protection, road maintenance, and public 
safety.”226  Use of these funds to provide efficient local government 
services and enhanced property values is important.  For the most part, 
these types of taxes are transparent and allow local governments to be 
accountable to their citizens.227 
The tax disputes arising because of the state mandated exemption 
of property tax for certain charitable organizations has changed over 
time based on political and social beliefs and attitudes.  While there 
are many historical and policy reasons for allowing charitable tax-
exempt property to be exempt from taxes, there are just as many 
reasons for taxing them.228  “Almost all western countries (and many 
underdeveloped countries) recognise the desirability of supporting 
nonprofit organisations by granting tax exemptions to charities and to 
donors.  The details differ but there is a broad international consensus 
that some reliefs are in principle justified.”229  Yet, there is also the 
belief that “no exemption should be granted unless it will be beneficial 
to a substantial segment of the population of the state and unless all 
similar properties or similarly situated taxpayers are accorded the 
same treatment.”230  Some of the greatest difficulties arise because 
similar properties and/or similar taxpayers are not being taxed equally 
when it comes to taxing the property of nonprofit charitable 
                                                                                                                                  
223 Id. at 3.  For example, the 1696 tax on windows in England; it was believed 
that the number of windows indicated property wealth.  Id.  To avoid the tax, 
homeowners boarded up their windows or built homes with few windows causing 
negative effects not only on aesthetics but also on health.  Id. 
224 Id. at 8. 
225 See id. at 8–9. 
226 Id. at 9. 
227 Id. 
228 See generally JAMES KESSLER, ETIENNE WONG & MARY ASHLEY, TAXATION 
OF CHARITIES & NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS 1–19 (11th ed. 2017) (citation 
omitted) (outlining policy issues in charity taxation). 
229 Id. at 5. 
230 INT’L ASS’N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, STANDARD ON PROPERTY TAX POLICY 
17 (2010); Int’l Ass’n of Assessing Officers, Standard on Property Tax Policy, in 
FERDINAND P. SCHOETTLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: THE LAW AND POLICY OF 
MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL TAXATION 65, 67 (2003). 
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organizations. 
Some argue that exemption from property tax facilitates the work 
of the charitable organizations by allowing as much available funding 
as possible to be directed toward the mission. 231   Organizations 
provide benefits to the public and deliver services that may not be 
provided by private businesses oftentimes more effectively or less 
costly than the state.232  And an altruistic view provides that some 
charities “promote important values, including voluntarism, self-
responsibility, and participative democracy[,]” and provide a 
“mechanism for encouraging philanthropy.”233 
James Douglas explains that western civilization developed 
systems for the allocation of resources.234  They symbolize the market, 
the ballot box, and the charitable nonprofit sector.235  Douglas explains 
that the importance of this third (nonprofit) sector is that it does not 
just affect certain segments of the population, but affects everyone.236  
Similarly, the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs 
states: 
[T]he contributions of voluntary organizations to broad 
scale social and scientific advances have been widely 
and frequently extolled.  Charitable groups were in the 
forefront of ridding society of child labor, abolitionist 
groups in tearing down the institution of slavery, civic-
minded groups in purging the spoils system from public 
office.  The benefits of nonprofit scientific and 
technological research include the great reduction of 
scourges such as tuberculosis and polio, malaria, 
typhus, influenza, rabies, yaws, bilharziasis, syphilis 
and amoebic dysentery.  These are among the myriad 
products of the nonprofit sector that have at least 
indirectly affected all Americans and much of the rest 
                                                                                                                                  
231 See Bruce R. Hopkins, Giving USA: Charitable Donations Grew in 2012, but 
Slowly, Like the Economy, in TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 34, 35 (Matthew Bender ed., 3d ed. 2014). 
232 See KESSLER ET AL., supra note 228, at 5. 
233 See id. at 5; see also Hopkins, supra note 231, at 35 (alteration in original) 
(“Philanthropic giving fares best in a known environment, and has been dependent, 
in part, on certain factors holding true over the decades, including the charitable tax 
deduction . . . .”). 
234 James Douglas, Why Charity: The Case for a Third Sector, in TAX EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 52, 52. 
235 See id. 
236 Id.  
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of the world besides.237   
Others believe that tax exemption is warranted based on a market 
and social theory, called the “subsidy theory.”238  The subsidy theory 
states that “charitable organizations relieve the government of burdens 
by providing essential goods and services that the government 
otherwise would be responsible for delivering.”239  The theory is 
premised on the notion that charitable purposes and organizations are 
worthy of promotion, and it is the government that should promote 
them through an indirect subsidy—the tax exemption.240  Some critics 
have perceived the subsidy theory to be an incomplete explanation for 
the exemption because it has not been regarded as universally 
applicable to all nonprofit organizations.241 
                                                                                                                                  
237 Comm’n on Private Philanthropy & Pub. Needs, Giving in America, Towards 
a Stronger Voluntary Sector, in TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 41, 44. 
238 Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for 
Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 
430 (1998). 
239 Id.; see H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19 (1938) (“The exemption from taxation 
of money or property devoted to charitable and other purposes is based upon the 
theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from 
financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from 
public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general 
welfare.”); see also McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1972) 
(“[T]he Government relieves itself of the burden of meeting public needs which in 
the absence of charitable activity would fall on the shoulders of the Government.”). 
240 For example, the theory provides that charitable organizations deliver 
“charity”, which includes health care services to the poor free of charge because, in 
part, the provision of such services is recognized as a community benefit under 
traditional trust law, and it relieves the government of the burden of providing such 
services.  Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit 
Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 
332–38 (1991).  These are the same factors used by the IRS and courts in 
determining whether an organization deserves tax-exempt status as a “charitable” 
organization.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1 (2017). 
241 See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1578, 1620–21 (1992) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (explaining 
subsidy theory, scrutinizing its shortcomings, and suggesting a tax expenditure 
analysis revealing its weaknesses).  A critic of the subsidy theory suggests that: 
“[E]mbedding substantive policy programs in the tax system forces ill-equipped tax 
administrators and legislative tax committees to make substantive policy decisions.  
Congressional spending eludes proper scrutiny by substantive policy committees 
whenever Congress includes such spending programs in tax legislation.  Similarly, 
this practice forces the IRS to make substantive policy decisions when formulating 
regulations that interpret legislation.”  Id. at 1621 (citations omitted); see also 
STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 95–96, 106 (1985) 
(discussing administrative burdens of implementing substantive income tax 
policies). 
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VI.A UNIFORM MODEL 
What is clear from the literature, and a review of statutory and case 
law, is that consistency in this area is not only needed, but will provide 
the charitable sector with stability in one critical area of this constantly 
changing philanthropic world.  It is time to propose clear standards 
that can be adopted in every state, and administered in local counties 
and municipalities.  However, adoption depends on economic need, 
philosophy around tax exemption, politics, strength and size of the 
charitable sector, and taxing standards and authorities within each 
state.242  Since taxes at the local level, especially property taxes, hold 
such critical importance and are structured to meet a great number of 
fiscal needs, a consistent tax scheme must address these as much as 
possible.243 
A review of how hospitals have navigated property tax exemption 
provides a variety of potential solutions for addressing this issue, as 
seen in the cases discussed earlier.244  Many states have required that 
hospitals qualifying for a charitable exemption under state statutes 
offer a specific amount of charitable care annually.245  This has caused 
problems for several reasons.  First, many state constitutional 
provisions, which are the basis for property tax exemptions, require 
that property be used exclusively for a charitable purpose. 246  
“Allowing a hospital that mostly provides care under a fee-for-service 
model to claim an exemption simply by offering a portion of its care 
for free or reduced prices would likely have constitutional problems in 
many states.”247  Second, the exemption is meant for truly charitable 
                                                                                                                                  
242 See generally SCHOETTLE, supra note 230, at 15–33 (citations omitted) 
(discussing the history and role of state and local taxes, and setting forth principles 
that should guide tax design). 
243 See id. at 18–20, 597–98 (citations omitted) (discussing the historical 
importance of property tax revenue to local government, and noting a trend towards 
uniformity in other areas of state taxation). 
244 See, e.g., Hosp. Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1317 
(Pa. 1985); AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456, 496 (2015). 
245 Gabriel O. Aitsebaomo, The Nonprofit Hospital: A Call for New National 
Guidance Requiring Minimum Annual Charity Care to Qualify for Federal Tax 
Exemption, 26 CAMPBELL L. REV. 75, 77 (2004) (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE ANN. § 311.031(2) (West 2004); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 127355 
(Deering 2003)). 
246 See generally Elizabeth Siegal & Scott Metcalf, Property Tax Exemptions: 
An Overview of State Constitutional and Statutory Provisions, CIVIC FED’N (2000), 
https://www.civicfed.org/civic-federation/publications/property-tax-exemptions-
overview-state-constiutional-and-statutory-pro (providing an inventory of local 
government assessing practices regarding the granting of property tax exemptions to 
nonprofit organizations). 
247 Jennifer Carr, The Growing Fight Over Hospital Tax Exemptions, TAX 
continued . . . 
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organizations and not organizations with for-profit missions, 
subsidiaries and partnerships.248 
New Jersey recently attempted to pass a bill that would have 
required nonprofit hospitals to pay a fee per bed to offset costs to their 
communities, but it was vetoed by Governor Christie.249  The bill was 
to apply statewide,250 the fee would have been mandatory, and would 
have applied only to charitable institutions.251  
These attempts at providing equity when dealing with hospitals, 
and oftentimes universities, have fallen short.252  The solutions do not 
deal with issues of equity or valuation.253  The questions continue to 
be, what is being taxed, and is it being taxed consistently across the 
board?  The scholarly literature and much of the case law discusses 
mostly the large nonprofit charitable organizations, while leaving the 
smaller organizations out of the conversation or left to be dealt with 
later, when putting together PILOTs and other agreements.254  The fact 
that these smaller organizations do not have the same power or voice 
as the larger groups makes it all the easier to leave them out of the 
discussions.255  The hybrid organizations discussed briefly in this 
Article would also benefit by contributing to any proposed solution.256 
One theory, the feasibility of which was explored by author Robert 
Grimm, is to enact the “donative theory,” which sets a thirty-three 
percent threshold for all tax exemptions and deductions as a property 
tax solution.257  Criticizing the traditional theories and refining and 
                                                                                                                                  
NOTES (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.taxnotes.com/exempt-organizations/exempt-
organizations/growing-fight-over-hospital-tax-
exemptions/2016/10/01/m95n?highlight=jennifer%20carr. 
248 Jamie C. Yesnowitz et al., State & Local Tax Alert, GRANT THORNTON 9–10 
(Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.grantthornton.com/~/media/content-page-
files/tax/pdfs/SALT-general/2017/Outlook-2017-01-13-17.ashx (citing Carr, supra 
note 247) (“As New Hampshire state Rep. David Hess (R) noted: ‘Hospitals and 
private universities are big businesses . . . I think we need to start a conversation 
about why we are carving out a special exception for them.’”). 
249 Alex Wolf, Christie Pocket-Vetoes NJ Hospital Tax Exemption Bill, LAW360 
(Jan. 19, 2016, 5:43 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/747999/christie-pocket-
vetoes-nj-hospital-tax-exemption-bill.  
250 S. 4903, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2015). 
251 See id.  
252 See Rashi Fein, On Achieving Access and Equity in Health Care, 83 
MILBANK Q. 1, 7–9 (2005).  
253 See id.  
254 Langley et al., supra note 168, at 1.  
255 Carr, supra note 247.  
256 See id.  
257 See Robert Grimm, Targeting the Charitable Property-Tax Exemption to 
Collective Goods, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE 
BATTLEFIELD, supra note 19, at 321, 321–22. 
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expanding other theories, Professors Mark A. Hall and John D. 
Colombo developed the donative theory, which posits that only those 
charitable organizations funded substantially by philanthropic 
donations deserve and should be entitled to tax exemption.258  Their 
arguments draw on economics “strongly buttressed by the leading 
theories of distributive justice and by the pluralistic values that 
characterize the third [nonprofit] sector.”259   The donative theory 
suggests that the primary rationale for the charitable exemption is to 
subsidize those organizations capable of attracting a substantial level 
of donative support from the public—that is, donative nonprofits.260 
Mr. Grimm suggests that targeting property tax exemptions to 
collective goods and the belief that “a substantial amount of donations 
given by the public represent worthiness and an acknowledgment of 
citizens’ willingness to allow a nonprofit to receive governmental 
subsidies,” indicates that most nonprofits would lose their property tax 
exemption. 261 
While these solutions have merit, a simpler approach might be to 
commission the American Bar Association to address the issue in a 
Model Code, giving incentive for states to follow suit in a more 
consistent manner when taxing property owned by charitable nonprofit 
organizations.  Such an effort would require legislatures to pass 
statutes with consistent language and state courts to interpret the laws 
in keeping with established law.262  The Code would set forth which 
properties would be taxed and at what rate, delineate what kind of 
exempt organization (i.e. educational, charitable, cultural) was taxable, 
what size based on gross income (i.e. greater than $500,000), based on 
ownership, use or both, much like the United Kingdom.  There would 
be a mandatory tax based on size (determined by yearly gross income) 
for organizations falling within a defined class (similar to Boston’s 
PILOT program), with smaller organizations owning property required 
to pay less or nothing at all.  While there would be consistency, there 
would also be some discretion provided to local governments (terms of 
                                                                                                                                  
258 See Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the 
Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1383–84 (1991). 
259 Id. at 1389 (alteration in original). 
260 See id. at 1389–90, 1433 (asserting that the donative theory has a “unique 
ability to tie together all of the major components of the taxation of charities.”).  The 
theory fits donative nonprofits better than commercial nonprofits, which, because 
they generate income from other sources, do not rely on contributions to the same 
extent as donative nonprofits.  “It explains the deduction for charitable contributions, 
the income tax exemption, and the property tax exemption.”  Id. at 1433.  It also 
“nicely explains” the sales tax exemption for charities.  Id. at 1433 n.152. 
261 Grimm, supra note 257, at 343–44. 
262 See Cornell L. Sch. Legal Info. Inst., supra note 18. 
0"'0 00
*0
*0)0	*0*0*
-*0 '0
years, etc.) in recognition of their needs. 
Another option is a sliding scale fee based on gross income for all 
organizations, regardless of size, with a requirement that these groups 
focus on revitalization efforts by creating City Districts.  The city of 
Philadelphia partnered with businesses, government and academic 
leaders (including the University of Pennsylvania and Drexel 
University) to create economic development in a University City 
District.263  Penn, Drexel and the University of Sciences together 
contribute sixty-five percent of the Districts’ $5.2 million annual 
budget.264  Such an effort would allow the exempt organizations to 
focus on their missions and include as part of their operations, a piece 
that encourages community revitalization.  If the tax-exempt 
organization is an educational organization, the effort could focus on 
education; if it is an arts organization, it could focus on arts and 
culture.265  The risk with this type of tax scheme would be requiring 
too much diversion of mission as charitable organizations focus on 
varying projects to meet their tax commitments, which might lead to 
mission drift. 
VII.CONCLUSION 
It is best to remember Adam Smith’s maxim when devising a tax 
scheme.266  It states that:  
The subjects of every state ought to contribute to the 
support of the government, as nearly as possible in 
proportion to their respective abilities[,] . . . [t]he tax 
which each individual is bound to pay ought to be 
certain, and not arbitrary[,] . . . [e]very tax ought to be 
levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most 
likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it[,]     
                                                                                                                                  
263 See Jacob Adelman, Study Calls for University City, W. Center City 
‘Innovation District’, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
http://www.philly.com/philly/business/real_estate/commercial/study-calls-for-ucity-
w-center-city-innovation-district-20170517.html (last updated May 18, 2017); 
Philadelphia’s University City District, PA. MUN. LEAGUE, 
http://www.pamunicipalleague.org/index.asp?SEC=F3C35D8B-41DF-4E00-A538-
A2E1B9961060&DE=0FE1634E-BE13-44CA-AAD8-10763F9471DA (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2017).  
264 Philadelphia’s University City District, supra note 263. 
265 See generally id. (describing the positive impact of the University City 
District developments on the local community); see also Liz Eliano, Museum 
Troubles in Boston, City Wants More $$$, HYPERALLERGIC (Jan. 3, 2012), 
https://hyperallergic.com/44174/boston-pilot-nonprofits/. 
266 See MILL, supra note 1, at 802 (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS bk. v, ch. ii (1776)). 
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. . . [and] [e]very tax ought to be so contrived as both to 
take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as 
little as possible over and above what it brings into the 
public treasury of the state.267 
While PILOTs are being instituted more frequently, they are 
inconsistent, leave too much to local and municipal decision-making, 
are oftentimes seen as arbitrary, and can be used as political blackmail 
or land use tools.268  PILOTs provide little revenue in the long term 
and can lead charitable nonprofits to raise fees or in extreme situations 
cut their services.269  The better solution is a Model Act, drafted with 
enough guidance for states to adopt their own, similar statutes. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
267 See id. at 802–03 (alteration in original). 
268 See Evelyn Brody, The States' Growing Use of a Quid-Pro-Quo Rationale 
for the Charity Property Tax Exemption, 56 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 269, 286–88 
(2007). 
269 See NSFRE Gov’t Relations Comm., Payments in Lieu of Taxes, ASS’N 
FUNDRAISING PROFS. 1, 2 (Jan. 1997), 
http://www.afpnet.org/files/contentdocuments/pilot_position_paper.pdf. 
